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DDAS Accident Report 
 
Accident details 
Report date: 19/04/2006 Accident number: 57 
Accident time: 11:00 Accident Date: 08/07/1997 
Where it occurred: Cap. Agua, Uige Country: Angola 
Primary cause: Management/control 
inadequacy (?) 
Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 16/07/1997 
ID original source: MD/MJ/JP/TJ/SC Name of source: INAROEE 
Organisation: [Name removed]  




Date record created: 23/01/2004 Date  last modified: 23/01/2004 
No of victims: 3 No of documents: 2 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system:  Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale: Uige Map series: Map 59 
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name: 1:100 000  
 
Accident Notes 
victim ill (?) 
inadequate communications (?) 
handtool may have increased injury (?) 
inadequate medical provision (?) 
no independent investigation available (?) 
safety distances ignored (?) 




An internal report from the demining group dated 16th July 1997 was made available. The 
following summarises its content.  
The investigators visited the site on 9/10th July. They found that the accident occurred in a 
minefield laid by government troops in 1991/2. The mines were irregularly spaced in 3km long 
lanes. PPM-2 and POMZ-2 mines were found (largely) in different parts of the field. There 
was "scrub" about a metre high where the accident occurred and the ground was "hard clay 
with some organic mix" which allowed the use of detectors. Two parallel lines of PPM-2 mines 
had been found with an "exploratory base line". Further lanes were being cut to confirm the 
direction of the mine-lines. The accident occurred in a lane that was beside another in which 
the location of found mines had been marked with sticks after their removal. On the other side 
of the accident lane, mines were "visible", so allowing a visual assessment of where the 
mines could be expected.  
Victim No.1 wore a frag-jacket and visor. The accident occurred when he was "due to start his 
handover" at 11:00. The Commanders pointed out to him that he appeared to have missed a 
mine and as he was "crouching down… his right foot slipped backwards and activated the 
concealed mine". The Commanders were not wearing visors but were wearing frag-jackets.  
At 11.42 the ambulance arrived at Uige hospital. At 15:10 the Medevac flight left for Luanda.  
The investigators tested Victim No.1's metal detector and found it to be working properly. 
They commented that there was no procedure to separate and test equipment involved in an 
accident, [which implied they were uncertain whether they had tested the right detector]. 
Victim No.1's frag-jacket was damaged, but how extensively was not recorded. 
The Brigade Commander said that he and the Section Commander approached Victim No.1 
as he was demining and noticed a break in the mine-pattern. They "instructed the deminer to 
return to a safe area and to recheck his lane". The accident occurred as he was returning to 
the safe area. 
The victim said that he was feeling unwell. He knew there were missed mines in his lane and 
could see the pattern" and one mine. There was a concealed mine a metre in front of the 
visible mine and he stepped on that. 
 
Conclusion 
The investigators concluded that the deminer "was focusing on the exposed mine.. and…did 
not employ the detector correctly". He kept on working when others were too close. The 
injuries to the Commanders were the result of them "being within a 25 metre distance of a 
working deminer" and, in Victim No.3's case his injuries occurred because he was not 
wearing the protective equipment available. The paramedics acted quickly and effectively but 
the hospital was "ill equipped".  Supervisors had to buy medical equipment to allow a blood 
transfusion to take place. The communications equipment was "unsuitable". They found there 
was a "lack of direction on discipline matters" from above, which had "impeded" the 
supervisors, and commented that absenteeism was rife, with periods of up to one month's 




The investigators recommended that the SOP requiring  "safety equipment" to be worn at all 
times should specify visors. Also that a procedure for "handling equipment" involved in an 
accident must be devised, that disciplinary procedure for absenteeism should be formulated 
and that the demining group should have a period of leave, followed by retraining. They 
further recommended that all accident victims should be evacuated to Luanda and that 




Victim number: 77 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: 4 hours 10 minutes 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket 
 
Summary of injuries: 
 
AMPUTATION/LOSS 
Leg Below knee 
Arm Below elbow 
COMMENT 
No medical report was made available. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 78 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: yes 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 
Protection issued: Frag jacket 
Long visor 
Protection used: Frag jacket 
 




No medical report was made available. 
Victim Report 
Victim number: 79 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: supervisory  Fit for work: presumed 
Compensation: not made available Time to hospital: not recorded 









No medical report was made available. 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as "Management/control inadequacy" because the 
procedures in place were inadequate to cover the situation.  
The field supervisors noticed Victim No.1's errors but did not instruct him how best to recover 
from the situation, were not wearing visors and were standing too close to the victim, so also 
suffered injury. They were not criticised for this, although changes to procedures were 
recommended. The secondary cause is listed as a “Field control inadequacy”. 
The investigators made recommendations for improved medical and communication 




A document titled "Immediate action drill" was on file at the country MAC. The document 
detailed what a deminer should do if he suddenly found himself in a mined area. 
The Portuguese version of the accident report includes obvious errors of times, dates and 
interpretation: the word "internal" is translated as "international" for example. [The failure to 
transpose numerical data accurately implies a carelessness that may make the veracity of 
translated reports suspect.] 
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